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We examine the effects of two juxtaposed events – regulatory short sale bans and 
exchange efforts to facilitate high-frequency trading (HFT) – on multiple dimensions of 
market quality. Between 2011 and 2013, the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE) launched a 
smart trading platform (SIBE-Smart) and introduced colocation facilities to attract HFT. 
During this time two short sale bans were imposed on the SSE. Comparing the market 
before and after these events, we find that while SIBE-Smart attracts some HFT, 
colocation does not. However, following both of these events, liquidity and price 
efficiency decline. Colocation, implemented during the second ban, is accompanied by 
an across-the-board deterioration in market quality. Strikingly, SIBE-Smart, which 
precedes a ban, also brings significant reductions in market quality. These results are in 
contrast to existing studies that show increased HFT resulting from technological 
inducements. We conclude that the beneficial effects of HFT on liquidity and price 
efficiency are negated in the presence of regulatory restrictions on trading.  
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1. Introduction
Technological innovations in the last decade have changed the trading landscape 
from one dominated by human intermediaries to a latency-reduction race amongst 
machines.1 This new trading paradigm, popularly known as high-frequency trading 
(HFT), has garnered immense interest from the media, in academia, and among 
regulators. The debate on whether HFT is a net benefit to investors continues, with 
evidence pointing to both positive and negative effects on market quality.2 
This ambiguity about the impact of HFT in modern markets dominated by HFT 
is a special challenge to regulators and exchanges. Regulators want to ensure that any 
proposed regulation curbs the undesirable effects of HFT without undoing the benefits. 
The dilemma is highlighted in a recent statement by Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Chair Mary Jo White: “The SEC should not roll back the 
technology clock or prohibit algorithmic trading, but we are assessing the extent to 
which specific elements of the computer-driven trading environment may be working 
against investors rather than for them.”3 At the same time, exchanges that adopt 
technologies to facilitate modern trading practices must keep in mind that regulations 
may impact HFTs differently from other traders. Therefore any data-based evidence on 
1
 Although estimates of the total volume attributable to HFT are not easy to obtain and depend on how exactly HFT is 
defined, as of 2009 HFT accounted for between 60-73% of all US equity trading, with that number falling to about 
50% in 2012 and 2013. For a breakdown of HFT volume by year for US equities, see 
http://tabbforum.com/opinions/high-frequency-trading-an-important-conversation. For the Spanish market, citing 
BME as their source, Blas, González, and Villanueva (2011) estimate that HFT account for 25-30% of SSE total 
volume in 2010. A recent report by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA, 2014) estimates that HFT 
represent 32% of value traded, 29% of trades, and 46% of orders of the most frequently traded SSE-listed stocks.
2
 Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) find that algorithmic trading (of which HFT is a subset) improves market 
quality by reducing spreads and adverse selection and improving the informativeness of quotes. Hasbrouck and Saar 
(2013) and Brogaard (2010) also document evidence of lower short-term volatility and better price discovery 
associated with HFT. Brogaard, Hagströmer, Nordén, and Riordan (2015) find that although colocation provides 
informational advantages to HFT traders, overall market quality is improved after the introduction of colocation. 
However, more recent studies also document negative effects of HFT. Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2015) find that 
algorithmic trading is detrimental to the market quality of small stocks. Baron, Brogaard, and Kirilenko (2012) show 
that HFT firms generally do not provide liquidity to markets, and in fact their most profitable trades are the ones that 
most aggressively take liquidity. Egginton, Van Ness, and Van Ness (2014) point to quote stuffing practices by HFTs. 
We discuss these and other related research in Section 2.  
3
 See full text of speech at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312#.U86NC_ldWzd  
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the impact of regulation and technological improvements in modern markets should be 
of broad interest to regulators as well as to investors who are affected by the rules. 
In this study we aim to provide such evidence. Specifically, we examine whether 
HFTs respond to technological inducements in the presence of trading restrictions, and 
we study the net effect of the interplay of regulations and technological improvements 
on market quality. This is an important issue because studies that document the positive 
effects of HFT on market quality have generally examined markets without regulatory 
restrictions. We exploit a unique setting that spans the interspersing of two short sale 
bans with infrastructure upgrades and colocation to induce HFT on the Spanish Stock 
Exchange (SSE). We conduct multiple event studies with a view to understanding how 
various dimensions of market quality – liquidity, price efficiency, returns to liquidity 
provision, and adverse selection – are impacted by the interaction of HFT with short 
sale restrictions.  
Short sale bans are a common tool used by regulators around the world, mostly 
in times of precipitous price declines. Researchers generally agree that short sale bans 
have limited efficacy in stemming price falls and lead to a worsening of market quality. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, whether the effects of short sale bans are 
alleviated or exacerbated by efforts to increase HFT has not been explicitly tested. 
Notably, two studies examine the effect of the 2008 short sale ban in the context of 
HFTs. Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014b) study HFT versus non-HFT short 
selling and use the 2008 ban as an instrument. They find that HFT short sales degrade 
market quality. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) examine the effects of the U.S. short 
sale ban in 2008. They hypothesize that short sale bans should disproportionately 
damage liquidity in stocks where HFT firms are more active, but in the absence of 
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suitable data, they cannot verify this hypothesis. Furthermore, both of these studies 
examine the U.S. market at a time when HFT is already a dominant player. 
In contrast, our sample comes from the SSE at a time when it has little HFT 
activity, and we track market quality as the SSE adopts infrastructure upgrades to 
explicitly attract HFT.4 We then examine how regulatory restrictions impede HFT 
activity, with related effects on market quality. Given the timeline of events on the SSE, 
we are able to examine whether markets are able to attract HFT with technological 
inducements in the presence of trading restrictions. Do the positive effects of HFT on 
market quality overcome the negative impact of short sale bans? Or do HFTs stay away 
from markets with regulatory restrictions, thereby exacerbating the negative effects of 
short sale bans? We address these and related questions by analyzing several pre- and 
post-event windows surrounding the introduction of the smart trading platform SIBE-
Smart, colocation, and the two short sale bans.  
We document several findings. First, comparing the periods before and after all 
of these events (SIBE-Smart, colocation, and the two short sale bans), we find no net 
increase in HFT activity. Meanwhile liquidity worsens: Dollar depth decreases, spreads 
increase, and order book elasticity falls. Price efficiency declines as return 
autocorrelations increase. The SIBE-Smart trading platform introduction, which does 
not directly coincide with a ban but follows the first ban and precedes the second ban, is 
actually accompanied by an across-the-board deterioration of all liquidity measures, 
although it manages to attract a modest increase in HFT activity. In contrast, the 
colocation event, which is announced during the second short sale ban, is accompanied 
                                                          
4
 While direct estimates of HFT activity on the SSE are not available over our sample period, the 
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) estimates that in 2011, the start of our sample 
period, the share of some prominent HFT facilitating platforms (e.g., Chi-X, Turquoise, and BATS) in the 
total trading volume of all Spanish listed stocks ranged from under 1% to 1.2%. See Table 17 of the 
CNMV Bulletin, Q2, 2014. 
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by a reduction in HFT activity and sees significant liquidity and price efficiency 
declines. This contrasts directly with the results presented in Brogaard, Hagströmer, 
Nordén, and Riordan (2015), who find that colocation (without any regulatory 
restrictions) improves overall market depth and reduces spreads.  
As expected, the short sale bans result in liquidity declines, with the second ban 
seeing a steeper reduction in liquidity than the first ban. The sequence of events on the 
SSE also allows us to isolate the effects of colocation with and without the ban. We find 
that although the amount of HFT does not increase in either case, liquidity improves 
with colocation in the absence of a ban. 
Taken together, our results indicate that the regulatory restrictions are serious 
impediments that the technological inducements cannot overcome. HFT does not 
respond to the smart trading platform and colocation inducements, and the net result is a 
decline in liquidity and price efficiency. Overall the negative effects of short sale bans 
prevail. These results, which are in contrast to the beneficial effects of HFT on liquidity 
and price efficiency documented by earlier studies, indicate that the positive effects of 
HFT on market quality are countervailed in the presence of regulatory restrictions on 
trading.  Finally, our results underscore the importance of non-U.S. market settings in 
arriving at conclusions about the effect of regulations and trading technology. There is 
an emerging body of literature that shows that many of the findings from U.S. markets 
do not generalize to other countries. We add to this international evidence on HFT, 
regulations, and market outcomes.5 
                                                          
5
 Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt, and Ysusis (2014) find no effect of HFTs on institutional trading costs using a U.K. 
sample. Korajczyk and Murphy (2015) use a Canadian dataset and find HFTs are less active for large institutional 
trades. Using Swedish data, van Kervel and Menkveld (2015) find that HFTs initially provide liquidity but then trade 
with institutional trades. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a 
review of the literature on HFT and short sales. Section 3 describes the institutional 
details of the SSE and discusses the timeline of events spanned by our sample period. 
Section 4 discusses the sample selection and market quality metrics, and Section 5 
presents our results. Section 6 presents robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes. 
2. HFT and short sale ban background 
2.1. HFT and market quality 
As technological advances replace old trading systems with newer and faster 
ones, regulators face the challenge of adapting rulemaking to the new realities of 
modern markets. In the U.S., the SEC’s effort to gauge the impact of HFT on market 
quality was accelerated by the Flash Crash of 2010, which many blamed on HFT (if not 
as a trigger, at least as a contributory factor). In March 2014, the SEC released a 
comprehensive review of the U.S. equity market structure, with half of the study 
devoted to reviewing the existing evidence on HFT. Around the same time (April 15, 
2014), European regulators imposed some of the toughest regulations on high-frequency 
(HF) traders in the E.U. These new rules include limits to keep price increments for 
low-priced securities from becoming too small, mandatory tests of trading algorithms, 
and a requirement that market makers provide liquidity for a minimum number of hours 
each day.6  
The U.S. and international evidence on the impact of HFT on market quality is 
mixed.7 Malinova, Park, and Riordan (2014) use data from the Toronto Stock Exchange 
                                                          
6
 For a complete list of the rules, see the European Parliament News release at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140411IPR43438/html/MEPs-vote-laws-to-regulate-
financial-markets-and-curb-high-frequency-trading.  
7
 In this section, we provide a review of the international evidence on HFT, with a focus on European markets, given 
that our sample comes from the SSE. For a summary additional research on HFT that is not covered in footnote 1, see 
the review provided by the SEC at http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf. 
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to examine how a tax on HF traders impacts market quality. They find that quoted and 
effective spreads increase and revenues to liquidity supply decline, indicating that a 
reduction in HFT activity harms some dimensions of market quality. Jovanovic and 
Menkveld (2013) examine the entry of an HFT firm in the Dutch market and find a 15% 
decline in effective spreads and about 23% fall in adverse selection costs following the 
entry of this new HFT firm. Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt, and Ysusi (2014) do not find 
any evidence of increased institutional trading costs as a result of increased HFT 
activity facilitated by technology upgrades on the London Stock Exchange. Brogaard, 
Hagströmer, Nordén, and Riordan (2015) study a colocation upgrade at NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm which improves connectivity of high-speed traders. They find that 
liquidity increases for the overall market because high-frequency market makers use the 
enhanced speed to reduce their exposure to adverse selection and to better manage 
inventory. 
In contrast to these positive findings are other studies that document negative 
effects of HFT. Examining trades by HFT firms routed via a single broker in the 
London and Tokyo equity markets, Bershova and Rakhlin (2013) find mixed evidence: 
While spreads fall with higher HFT activity, short-term volatility increases. The 
Australian Industry Super Network, an umbrella organization representing savings and 
retirement funds, commissioned a study that concludes “HFT activities cost non-HFT 
market participants, including long term investors, up to $1.9 billion a year, with a best 
estimate of over $1.6 billion a year.”8 A study of foreign exchange markets conducted 
by the Bank of International Settlement finds that while HFTs can be beneficial to 
markets in normal times, they may be harmful to the functioning of markets in times of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
8
 http://www.industrysuperaustralia.com/assets/Reports/Quantifying-HFT-costs-June-2013as-published.pdf. 
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stress.9 In sum, whether HFT provides net benefits is still open for debate, which makes 
it challenging to devise appropriate rules to regulate these low latency traders. 
2.2. Short sale bans and market quality 
Researchers agree that short sellers perform a useful function by incorporating 
fundamental information into prices. Or, as Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) put it: 
“For the most part, financial economists consider short sellers to be the good guys.” 
Karpoff and Lou (2010) find that short sellers detect financial fraud in firms about 19 
months before the misrepresentation is publicly revealed. In a similar vein, Desai, 
Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006) show that short sellers pay attention to firms’ 
accounting numbers and can anticipate earnings restatements several months in 
advance. Given the information-gathering role that short sellers perform, it is no 
surprise that market quality declines when regulatory bans are imposed on short selling. 
The 2008 recession and the following European debt crisis in 2010-2011 saw 
several countries around the world impose ad hoc short sale bans to try to stem price 
declines. In the U.S., the SEC issued an emergency order restricting naked short selling 
in July 2008, and followed that up with an outright short selling ban in September. 
Analyzing the effects of this ban, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) find that market 
quality worsens because many algorithmic traders cannot act as informal market 
makers. With less competition, formal market makers can now charge greater rents for 
liquidity provision. Battalio, Mehran, and Schultz (2012) study a similar decline is U.S. 
stock markets following the S&P downgrade of the U.S. in 2011. They find that short 
sellers do not amplify stock price declines during times of market downturn. 
                                                          
9
 See full report at http://www.bis.org/publ/mktc05.pdf. 
8 
 
The 2011 debt crisis saw the imposition of short sale bans in Greece, Turkey, 
Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain. Similar to the U.S. experience, the evidence points to 
dubious efficacy of short sale bans. Beber and Pagano (2013) study the effects of the 
2008 stock price decline in 30 countries around the world. Comparing countries that did 
not impose a blanket ban on short-selling for all stocks to those that did, they conclude 
that the effect of such bans on stock prices is neutral at best. Bris, Goetzman, and Zhu 
(2007) analyze cross-sectional and time-series information from 46 countries and show 
that prices are more efficient in countries that allow and practice short sales.  
3. Institutional details of the Spanish Stock Exchange and time line of events 
The SSE has four trading platforms: Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, and Valencia. 
Trading is linked through the electronic Spanish Stock Market Interconnection System 
(SIBE), which handles more than 90% of transactions. The benchmark index is the 
IBEX-35, a capitalization-weighted index comprising the 35 most liquid Spanish stocks 
traded in the continuous market.10 Trading on SIBE is conducted from 9 a.m. to 5:30 
p.m., with an opening call auction from 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. and a closing auction from 
5:30 to 5:35 p.m. After the steep declines in markets Europe-wide during 2008, to 
which Spain was no exception, the IBEX-35 recovered remarkably to become Europe’s 
best performer in 2009. However, 2010 was a down year due to increased country risk 
and the weakness of the European financial sector. The index fell 17.43% after 
fluctuating in a very wide range of 35% between its peak and low. The drop in share 
prices, however, did not erode the levels of activity. Indeed, 2010 set a new record in 
SSE trading volume.  
                                                          
10
  The IBEX-35 index comprises the most important firms in the SSE. Perez-Rodriguez, Torra, and 
Andrada-Felix (2005) use the IBEX-35 sample for short horizon return forecasting. Meneu and Pardo 
(2004) use the IBEX-35 sample to examine large versus small investor behavior in the SSE. 
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In response to the tailspin that the European markets witnessed in mid-2011, 
ESMA (a body that coordinates the European Union’s market policies) issued a 
statement that all negative bets on financial stocks — in other words, short sales — 
would be curtailed in France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain effective August 11. This ban 
lasted until February 15, 2012, when the Spanish securities regulator, the Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) announced that the prohibition on short 
sales of Spanish shares under the EU Short Selling Regulation (EU236/2012) was no 
longer in effect after February 15. However, as many market commentators had 
anticipated, once the ban was removed, prices declined precipitously, leading the 
CNMV to announce that “European shares have been hit with extreme volatility that 
might cause the disorderly functioning of financial markets.” As a response, a second 
ban was introduced on July 23, 2012, which was subsequently lifted on January 31, 
2013. 
During this time the SSE also introduced major technology upgrades to integrate 
better with the bigger European exchanges and thereby attract HFT. Two major 
technology changes that facilitated faster trading were an upgrade of the SIBE-Smart 
platform and the introduction of colocation. Recognizing that HFT in securities markets 
was an established fact and a natural progression in the wake of the widespread 
introduction of electronic markets and the increasing use of computerized trading 
systems, the SSE committed to developing their trading infrastructure and 
communications technology. As part of their effort, they rolled out the SIBE-Smart 
platform on April 16, 2012, to better adapt SSE’s systems to new demands in terms of 
transaction speed and volume in the market. Following up on this technological 
enhancement, the SSE began offering colocation capabilities at its Data Processing 
Center in Madrid on Nov. 12, 2012, enabling trading firms to install their own trading 
10 
 
servers in close proximity to the exchange's trading engines and real-time price 
distribution systems. SSE officials stated that these efforts were expected to reduce 
latency, increase capacity for traders, and directly facilitate HFT.11  
Below, we present a schematic timeline showing the dates and events described 
above: 
 
4. Sample selection and market quality measures 
 Our sample comprises the SSE-listed IBEX-35 constituents from January 2010 
to December 2013. Due to index additions and deletions, our final sample includes 28 
stocks that are index constituents throughout our sample period. We also separately 
examine the seven largest market capitalization (Blue Chip) stocks on the SSE, since 
previous studies document HF traders’ preference for large and liquid stocks.12 For 
example, Hirschey (2013) finds that high frequency traders in his sample are more 
active in large than in small stocks (41% vs. 15%). 
Our data come from the SSE’s trade files, which report all trades time-stamped 
up to the hundredth of a second before April 16, 2012 (launch of the SIBE-Smart) and 
milliseconds afterwards, and limit order book (LOB) files. For each trade, the record 
includes the price and size. 
                                                          
11
 See announcement at http://www.world-exchanges.org/news-views/bme-successfully-upgrades-
spanish-stock-exchange%E2%80%99s-trading-platform.  
12
 We define the Blue Chip stocks as the seven IBEX-35 index constituents that were always in the top 
ten by market capitalization over the sample period. 
Jan. 31, 2013
SSB#2 ends
July 23, 2012
SSB#2 starts
Nov. 12, 2012
Colocation
April 16, 2012
SIBE-Smart 
launch
Feb. 15, 2012
SSB#1 ends
Aug. 11, 2011
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June 31, 2013
Sample period 
ends
Feb. 1, 2011
Sample period 
starts
SSB#2SSB#1
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The order book files contain snapshots of the five best ask and bid quotes of the 
LOB taken each time the LOB changes as a result of trades, order submissions, 
cancelations, or modifications. For each LOB level we have the quote record, the 
number of orders at that quote, and the displayed depth.13 Relatively large buy (sell) 
trades are allowed to walk up (down) the book. Thus, the trade price is actually the 
marginal price, that is, the price at which the last share of the trade was transferred. In 
the SSE there are no round lot sizes; the minimum trade size is one share.  
Both the trade and the LOB files contain a sequence code, allowing for a perfect 
match between trade and quotes. Since there are no price improvements (i.e., trades 
inside the spread) and every trade consumes liquidity either at the displayed ask or bid 
quote, it is straightforward to assign trade direction (i.e., buyer- or seller-initiated 
trades). A trade is classified as buyer-initiated (seller–initiated) if it consumes liquidity 
at the offer (demand) side of the LOB, which is commonly called the quote rule. 
We filter out records from the opening, closing, and intraday short-lived call 
auctions in each file and use only quotes and trades from the continuous session. We 
also filter out prearranged trades.  
4.1. HFT activity measures 
Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) compute message traffic in share 
volume and in dollar value as proxies for algorithmic trading. We compute the 
following four daily proxies for high-frequency trading: message traffic per minute (
idMTMin ), message traffic per euro-volume ( €idMTV ), message traffic per volume in 
shares ( idMTVSh ), and the number of non-zero quote-midpoint changes ( ∆ idQMid ). We 
                                                          
13
 The SSE allows iceberg orders, but the quote files do not provide information on hidden volume (see 
Pardo and Pascual, 2012, for details). 
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compute message traffic as the number of LOB updates per day, which is equivalent to 
summing all order submissions, cancelations, and revisions. 
4.2. Liquidity and market activity measures  
Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2015) find that algorithmic trading intensity impacts 
market liquidity. We follow the literature and compute several liquidity and market 
activity metrics. In the formulas below, i∈{1,…,28}, j∈{1,…,Nid}, k∈{1,…,5}, 
m∈{1,…,Md}, and t∈{1,…,Tid} are the sub-indexes for the i stocks, j LOB updates, k 
steps in the LOB, m 1-minute intervals, and t trades, respectively. Nid and Tid are the 
number of LOB updates and trades in day d, respectively, and Md = 510 for a full-length 
ordinary session. 
The quote midpoint ( ) is the average between the best ask ( ) and best bid (
) quotes of the LOB. Effective spread is two times the difference between the trade 
price ( ) and , the prevailing quote midpoint before trade t, multiplied by the trade 
direction ( = 1 for buyer initiated;  = -1 for seller-initiated). In computing the daily 
measure, we weight each observation by trade size, to obtain the trade-weighted 
effective spread ( idESpr ): 
( )1
1
2 =
=
−
=
∑
∑
T
it it it itt
id T
itt
s p q x
ESpr
s
    [1] 
where  is the size (in shares) of the t-th trade. 
 The accumulated displayed LOB euro-depth ( ijDepth ) is  
ijq
1
ija
1
ijb
itp itq
itx itx
its
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( )5 51 10.5 = == +∑ ∑ak k bk kij ij ij ij ijk kDepth v a v b    [2] 
where  ( ) is the displayed depth (in shares) at the k-th ask (bid) level of the LOB 
for the j-th quote update. As in eq. [1], the average accumulated depth for stock i and 
day d ( idDepth ) is computed by weighting ijDepth  by time.  
Following Näes and Skjeltorp (2006), we compute the elasticity of the ask side 
of the LOB at the j-th update ( aijLOBElast ) as  
( )11 4
1 1 1
1
/ 11
5 / 1 / 1
+
+
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 
−
= + 
− −  
∑
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v v v
LOBElast
v a q a a
.   [3] 
The elasticity of the bid side of the LOB ( bijLOBElast ) is computed analogously. The 
LOB elasticity ( ijLOBElast ) is the average of aijLOBElast  and bijLOBElast . We weight 
ijLOBElast by time to obtain the corresponding daily summary measure ( idLOBElast ).  
ESpr is an inverse measure of liquidity while Depth and LOBElast are direct measures 
of liquidity.  
For market activity, we use the following three daily measures: Vol is the daily 
volume in shares; Trades is the daily number of trades, and Vol€ is the daily volume in 
euros, computed as 
1
€
=
= ∑
T
id it itt
Vol s p      [4] 
4.3. Volatility and price efficiency measures 
Our metric for daily stock price volatility is the realized volatility ( idRVolat ), 
which is computed as the daily standard deviation of one-minute trade price returns,  
ak
ijv
bk
ijv
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where , and 
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1
d
M
id imm
d
r r
M
=
= ∑   . 
We compute two daily proxies for price efficiency; the first-order 
autocorrelation of one-minute trade price returns ( idCorr ) and the pricing error standard 
deviation ( idPrErr ) estimated using Hasbrouck (1993).  For each stock-day, we estimate 
a bivariate Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model for , where  is the return of 
trade t and  is the signed trade size. We choose the optimal VAR lag using the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and the model is estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares regression. idPrErr  is obtained from the coefficients of the Vector Moving 
Average representation of the VAR model and the variance-covariance matrix of the 
residuals. 
4.4. Realized spread and price impact 
We estimate the revenue to liquidity providers using the realized spread ( idRSpr ) 
and measure gross losses to liquidity demanders due to adverse selection using the price 
impact (PrImp) of a trade, as in Huang and Stoll (1996) and Hendershott, Jones, and 
Menkveld (2011). For stock i, the price impact of trade t ( itPrImp ) is two times the 
difference between the quote midpoint prevailing ∆ seconds after the focal trade (i.e., 
t+∆) and the midpoint prevailing right before trade t, multiplied by the trade direction: 
( )2 +∆= −it it it itPrImp q q x .     [6] 
1ln( ) ln( )im im imr p p −= −
{ }, st tr x tr
s
tx
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The daily average idPrImp  is weighted by trade size. The realized spread for trade t is 
computed as  
= −it it itRSpr ESpr PrImp ,      [7] 
and its daily average ( idRSpr ) is weighted by trade size. Results are reported for ∆= 5 
and 30 seconds. 
5. Results 
Table 1 presents the average descriptive statistics of our full sample as well as 
the Blue Chip stocks. Although the two samples have similar average stock prices, 
measures of HFT activity, liquidity, and volume are higher for the Blue Chip stocks 
than for the full sample. For example, while daily message traffic (which includes all 
updates to the limit order book) is about 46,397 for the full sample, it is more than twice 
that (100,037) for the Blue Chip stocks. The Blue Chips also have higher volume and 
depth, and lower bid-ask spread, which is expected since they are the largest 
capitalization stocks in the SSE. 
[Table 1] 
To evaluate the impact on market quality, in all the remaining results reported in 
this section, we estimate an event’s impact on our variable(s) of interest by running a 
pooled regression. The general form of the regression is as follows: 
1α β β ε−= + + +id E id V id idY E Volat     [8] 
where  is each of the daily market quality metrics defined in Section 4 and  is a 
dummy for the event under consideration (SIBE-Smart introduction, colocation, or short 
sale bans). The coefficient of interest is , the coefficient on the dummy that 
idY idE
Eβ
16 
 
represents the post-event period. It captures the difference in each dependent variable 
between the pre- and post-event period. We use one-period-lagged IBEX-35 volatility 
(computed as the daily high/low) as a control variable ( 1−idVolat ) because Cáceres, 
Moreno, and Rodriguez (2014) show that the short sale bans on the SSE affect 
volatility. We also report the estimated percentage change in each dependent variable, 
computed as ( )100 β α β + E V Volat . Standard errors are clustered by both stock and 
date using the procedure outlined in Thompson (2011).  
In Section 5.1 we present the overall effects from before the first change is 
introduced to after all of the changes are completed, to determine the net effect of the 
bans and the technology upgrades on market quality. In the subsequent subsections we 
present the effects of each individual event.  
5.1. Effects of all events combined 
We begin by examining changes in HFT activity in the SSE before and after the 
time window that includes the technology changes and short sale bans. The pre-events 
period is Feb 1, 2011 to Jun 31, 2011 and the post-events period is Feb 1, 2013 to Jun 
31, 2013. We report four proxies for HFT: message traffic per minute (MTMin), 
message traffic per euro volume (MTV€), message traffic per share volume (MTVSh), 
and the number of non-zero quote midpoint changes (∆QMid). Results are in Table 2 
Panel A. 
[Table 2] 
For the full sample, there is a weak (significant at 10%) increase in message 
traffic per minute. None of the other proxies for HFT show any significant change 
between the pre- and post-periods. Even for the Blue Chip stocks, which are the most 
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liquid and are expected to attract the most HFT attention (Hirschey, 2013), we find 
significant change in message traffic per minute and message traffic per euro volume, 
while the other two proxies (message traffic per share volume and the number of non-
zero quote midpoint changes) show no change. Overall, there is only weak evidence that 
during our event window there is any significant boost to HFT activity on the SSE. 
To examine changes in stock liquidity and market activity, we examine liquidity 
and trading activity metrics that earlier research has linked to HFT. In Table 2, Panels B 
and C, we report the estimated coefficients from the pooled regression model. The 
dependent variables that capture liquidity are the trade weighted effective spread (ESpr), 
quoted depth (Depth), and limit order book elasticity (LOBElast), reported in Panel B, 
and the market activity variables in Panel C are daily volume in shares (Vol), daily 
volume in euros (Vol€), and daily number of trades (Trades).  
By all measures, liquidity declines. For the full sample as well as the Blue Chip 
stocks, the trade-weighted effective spread increases and limit order book elasticity 
decreases.  There is no offsetting increase in depth; in fact, depth shows no significant 
change in this period. The market activity measures show similar patterns: Most 
measures show a significant decline. Overall, the results are consistent with liquidity 
reduction in the SSE stocks during this period. 
Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2014a) find that HFT helps incorporate 
information faster into prices and make them more efficient, while Jiang, Peterson, and 
Doran (2014) find that binding short sale constraints contribute to volatility. 
Furthermore, in order-driven markets (like the SSE), Menkveld (2013) finds that some 
HFTs may take on a market-making role, while Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun 
(2014) find that during the U.S. Flash Crash in 2010, HFTs consumed liquidity through 
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aggressive (liquidity demanding) orders and exacerbated the price declines. Based on 
the previous research, we next examine changes in price efficiency and volatility (Table 
3 Panel A) and realized spread and price impact of trades (Table 3 Panel B).  
[Table 3] 
In Panel A, for the full sample, pricing error (PrErr) and volatility (RVolat) 
show little change; however, return autocorrelations (Corr) increase significantly, 
indicating that prices become less efficient. For the Blue Chip stocks, there is weak 
evidence of a reduction PrErr. There are no changes in other efficiency or volatility 
metrics. Overall, there is little evidence that the SSE stocks saw any appreciable 
increase in price efficiency during this period. 
In Panel B, we report the realized spread (RSpr) and price impact (PrImp) 
measures for five and 30 seconds after each trade. For the full sample, there is no 
change in realized spread, indicating that there is no significant change in the revenue 
earned by liquidity providers. Price impact increases at all horizons. Recalling the 
increase in autocorrelation of trade price returns (Corr) from Table 3, Panel A, the 
increase in price impact reported here is consistent with order flow autocorrelation 
increasing during this period. The results for the Blue Chip stocks show similar increase 
in price impacts, but unlike the full sample, for these liquid stocks, realized spreads fall 
significantly. So liquidity providers’ revenues from making a market in the Spanish 
Blue Chips fall in the post-events period. One explanation consistent with our results is 
that the changes may have attracted HFTs that follow arbitrage or speculative strategies 
(make directional bets) rather than market-making strategies (Menkveld and Zoican, 
2015).  
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5.2. Effects of the introduction of SIBE-Smart 
SIBE-Smart was introduced on April 16, 2012 to seamlessly connect the SSE 
with the other exchanges in Europe and facilitate high-speed traders. To evaluate the 
impact of this technological upgrade and the resulting faster trading platform, we 
compute and test for differences in the measures of various dimensions of market 
quality by comparing the pre-SIBE-Smart (March 1, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and post-
SIBE-Smart (April 16, 2012 - May 31, 2012) periods. In Table 4, we present the 
changes in HFT activity (Panel A), liquidity (Panel B), and market activity (Panel C) 
measures in this period.  
[Table 4] 
Regarding HFT activity, for the full sample all of the proxies of high speed 
trading except message traffic per volume show an increase post-SIBE-Smart 
introduction. Traffic per minute, volume (in euro) and number of quote mid-point 
changes all increase. For the Blue Chip stocks, two of the four metrics (message traffic 
per minute and quote mid-point changes) show significant increases as well. Overall, 
the evidence suggests that the smart trading platform indeed succeeded in attracting the 
high speed traders. 
  We next examine changes in stock liquidity and market activity following the 
SIBE-Smart introduction and report results in Table 4, Panel B. By most measures, 
liquidity declines. For the full sample, the trade-weighted effective spread increases 
while limit order book depth and elasticity decrease. For the measures of market activity 
in Table 4, Panel C, euro-volume and trade size show significant declines. Results for 
the Blue Chip stocks are similar. Overall, the results are consistent with liquidity 
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reduction in the SSE stocks during this period in spite of the introduction of the smart 
platform, which attracts some high speed traders.  
SIBE-Smart may facilitate high speed traders, but their activities do not seem to 
improve liquidity on the SSE. So we next ask if there are any other benefits to this 
upgrade in terms of improvements in price efficiency and/or reduction in volatility. 
Results are reported in Table 5, Panel A. 
[Table 5] 
For the full sample as well as the Blue Chip stocks there are significant increases 
in realized volatility, return autocorrelation, and standard deviation of pricing errors. We 
do not find any evidence that the introduction of the SIBE-Smart platform helps 
improve the informativeness of prices by reducing pricing errors. Thus, our results are 
different from Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012), who analyze a technology upgrade on 
the Deutsche Boerse and find liquidity improvements due to a reduction in adverse 
selection. They also find that prices become more efficient after the upgrade. In 
contrast, and similar to our findings, Menkveld and Zoican (2015) find that for a 
NASDAQ-OMX speed upgrade, spreads increase, possibly due to increased speculative 
trading by high frequency “bandits” who increase adverse selection costs.  It appears 
that in our setting, the effect of regulatory uncertainties (the impending first short sale 
ban) countervail the positive effects of technology upgrades that accrue during normal 
times. 
  We also examine the effect of this technological upgrade on the realized spreads 
and price impacts of trades. As before, we report the regression coefficients with 
realized spreads and price impacts calculated at two time horizons: 5 and 30 seconds. 
Results are reported in Table 5, Panel B. For the full sample as well as the Blue Chip 
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stocks, there is no change in realized spread, indicating that there is no significant 
change in the revenue earned by liquidity providers. Price impact increases at all 
horizons, evidencing higher adverse selection.  
5.3. Effects of the two short sale bans 
The SSE bans short selling twice during our sample period. The first short sale 
ban begins on August 11, 2011 and is lifted on February 15, 2012, and it affects 16 
stocks from the financial sector. There are no technological changes introduced during 
this ban. The second short sale ban begins on July 23, 2012, and ends on January 31, 
2013, affecting all the SIBE-listed stocks. However, while this second ban is in effect, 
the SSE introduces colocation on November 12, 2012. To control for this potentially 
relevant event, we limit the post-event period for the second short sale ban from July 23, 
2012 to November 11, 2012. As in previous tests, we use a pooled regression model 
with the (Volat
-1) control variable, and a dummy for the second short sale ban (SSB2), to 
indicate the incremental difference in each variable of interest during the second short 
sale ban, compared to the first short sale ban. We begin by examining the changes in 
HFT activity, liquidity, and market activity during the second ban, compared to the first 
ban. Results are presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6] 
For the full sample as well as the Blue Chip stocks, most metrics of HFT activity 
(Panel A) show a reduction, indicating that relative to the first ban, there is additional 
decline in HFT during the second ban. For example, compared to the first ban, the 
second ban saw 75.89 fewer messages per minute, which is significant at the 1% level. 
In Panel B, all liquidity measures show significant reductions during the second ban 
relative to their levels during the first ban. This is true of the full sample as well as the 
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Blue Chip stocks. Market activity (Panel C) shows across-the-board reductions for all 
the Blue Chip stocks. 
Reflecting the findings in the previous sections, when examining the price 
efficiency and volatility impacts of the second ban, in Table 7, Panel A, we find that 
return autocorrelations increase and volatility shows no change.  
[Table 7] 
Realized spread and price impact estimates in Table 7, Panel B, also show the 
same patterns as before: increased realized spreads and price impacts at both time 
horizons during the second short sale ban, relative to the first ban.  
5.4. Effects of the introduction of colocation 
Colocation reduces latency for high-speed traders, and prior research shows that 
this leads to improved market outcomes. For example, Conrad, Wahal, and Xiang 
(2015) study a technological change on the Tokyo Stock Exchange that reduces latency 
by allowing colocation and find that after the upgrade, price efficiency increases and 
trading cost declines. 
To facilitate high-speed traders, the SSE introduced colocation services on 
November 12, 2012. The peculiar nature of this introduction of colocation was that it 
happened during a time when the Spanish stock market had a regulatory short sale ban 
in effect: The second short sale ban began on July 23, 2012 and ended on January 31, 
2013. In this section, we test for differences in various metrics of market quality before 
and after colocation. First, we compare the “pre-colocation” period (July 23, 2013 – 
November 11, 2012), a time with banned short-selling and no colocation, with the 
“post-colocation” period (November 12, 2012 – January 31, 2013), a time with banned 
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short-selling and colocation. This test isolates the effect of colocation during a short sale 
ban. Second, we compare the “pre-ban” period (April 16, 2012 – July 22, 2012), a time 
with no ban and no colocation, with the “post-ban” period (February 1, 2013 – June 31, 
2013), a time with no ban but with colocation. This test isolates the effect of colocation 
without a short sale ban. These two tests together provide a complete picture of how 
colocation affects the SSE stocks under a regime of short sale ban versus no short sale 
ban. Table 8 presents the results. 
[Table 8] 
The Post- vs. pre-colocation dummy, which captures the effect of colocation in 
the presence of a short sale ban, shows declines in three of the four HFT proxies (Panel 
A). This is expected, since regulatory impediments lead to a decline in HFT activity 
(Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2013). Somewhat unexpectedly, we find similar 
reductions in HFT activity when comparing the effect of colocation without the ban (see 
the variable Post- vs. pre-ban). The reductions are not significant in most of the Blue 
Chip stocks, but overall, our results robustly document that colocation does not lead to 
any increase in HFT, with or without the short sale ban. 
 The liquidity and market activity impacts of colocation show some variation 
across the two event windows. In Table 8, Panels B and C, we present the results of the 
effects of colocation, with and without ban, on liquidity and market activity. While we 
find an across-the-board decline in liquidity and market activity measures when 
comparing the periods before and after colocation with the short sale ban (see variable 
Post- vs. pre-colocation), we find that effective spreads decline and depth and order 
book elasticity increase significantly when comparing the effects of colocation without 
the ban (see variable Post- vs. pre-ban). This is consistent with the literature, which 
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documents that increased HFT facilitated by colocation improves market liquidity 
characteristics. The richness of our unique setting allows us to show that such 
improvements do not accrue if there are regulatory restrictions to trading. 
In Table 9, we show that colocation is accompanied by volatility reduction but 
no significant change in realized spread, both with and without the ban. 
[Table 9] 
6. Robustness checks 
In robustness checks, we have tested the pre- versus post-ban time window for 
market quality effects of the first and the second short sale bans separately (instead of 
the incremental test of the second ban relative to the first, as presented in the main 
tables). Similar tests for liquidity and market activity metrics confirm the results 
presented: Both bans show liquidity reduction but the second ban shows stronger 
declines. Price efficiency metrics and realized spreads estimated separately around each 
of the two bans show results consistent with those presented. We also use additional 
proxies for liquidity, for example the Amihud illiquidity measure and relative bid-ask 
spread, and compute realized spread and price impact of trades at other time horizons 
(15 seconds). All conclusions hold.  
7. Conclusions 
Existing studies show that high-frequency traders, who largely dominate modern 
markets, improve liquidity and price efficiency but may also adversely select other 
investors and try to game other traders by creating congestion in the trading platforms. 
Our investigation of how HFT impacts markets reveals the key role of regulation in this 
equation: Whether HFTs have a positive or negative effect depends critically on the 
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regulatory framework within which these fast traders operate. In this study we identify a 
unique timeline of events that allow us to shed light on how market quality is affected 
when regulatory restrictions are juxtaposed with technological inducements to facilitate 
HFT. 
During 2011 and 2012, the SSE introduced two major technological changes to 
attract and facilitate HFT. In April of 2012 the SSE introduced the SIBE-Smart, a 
technologically upgraded trading platform, followed by colocation facilities in 
November of 2012. During this time, there were two short sale bans imposed by the 
SSE.  The first ban ended just before the SIBE-Smart introduction and the second ban 
started before the colocation event and ended several months later. We use this 
juxtaposition of events to reveal how HFT activity, market liquidity, price efficiency, 
returns to liquidity provision, and adverse selection are affected. 
 We document several findings. First, overall there is no increase in HFT when 
comparing the periods before and after all these events. By most metrics, liquidity 
worsened and price efficiency fell. Although the SIBE-Smart introduction preceded the 
first ban and managed to attract a modest increase in HFT, it was accompanied by 
reductions in liquidity and price efficiency. In contrast, the colocation event was 
introduced during the second short sale ban and failed to boost HFT activity in any 
significant way, also leading to a worsening of market quality. Finally, our timeline also 
allows us to isolate the effects of colocation with and without a short-sale ban. In 
comparing the effects of colocation with and without a ban, we find that although HFT 
does not increase in either case, liquidity improves with colocation in the absence of a 
ban but declines rather steeply when the ban is in effect. 
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 When regulatory restrictions are present, as in our setting, we find none of the 
positive effects of HFT-friendly technological improvements that have been 
documented by previous studies. Our results indicate that the effects of regulatory 
restrictions create serious impediments that technological inducements may not be 
capable of overcoming. Given that the bulk of the findings in HFT and short sale 
literature come from the U.S. markets, our study also adds to the small but growing 
body of evidence from an international markets perspective. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Statistics 
We provide average daily statistics for our full sample of 28 stocks and the subset of seven Blue Chip 
stocks for the period January 2010 to December 2013. We provide statistics on market capitalization; 
transaction price; volume in shares and euros; number of trades; relative bid-ask spreads; displayed depth 
at the five best levels of the LOB, both in shares and euros; the absolute open-to-close returns; the ratio 
between the highest and the lowest trade price, and message traffic. Standard deviations are in 
parentheses. We use the rank-sum statistic of Wilcoxon to tests for equality of medians. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistically significantly differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
All stocks Blue Chips
Market Cap. (/10000) 1151334.09 3559233.79 ***
(1721046.88) (2049702.52)
Price 17.09 19.94
(16.82) (24.55)
Volume (/10000) 551.43 1561.38 **
(972.30) (1507.33)
Euro Volume (/10000) 4421.48 14026.56 ***
(7476.87) (10346.16)
Trades 2786.76 6650.74 ***
(2962.78) (3950.21)
Relative bid-ask spread 0.0016 0.0008 ***
(0.0006) (0.0003)
Depth 58181.41 74376.74
(91080.94) (50423.75)
Depth (€) 385433.38 792616.64 ***
(353945.77) (507494.22)
Abs. open-to-close returns 0.0142 0.0128
(0.0032) (0.0023)
Price high/low 0.0297 0.0268
(0.0061) (0.0043)
Message Traffic 46396.96 100037.46 ***
(43541.41) (57042.96)
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TABLE 2 
All events combined: HFT, liquidity, and market activity 
We evaluate the net impact of the technological upgrades and short sale bans on the SSE from 2011 to 2012 on HFT activity (Panel A), liquidity (Panel B), and market 
activity (Panel C). We compare the “pre-events” (February 1, 2011 – June 31, 2011) and “post-events” periods (February 1, 2013 - June 31, 2013). This table presents the 
estimated coefficients from pooled regressions with double-clustered standard errors. HFT proxies are: message traffic per minute (MTMin); message traffic per euro-volume 
(MTV€); message traffic per volume in shares (MTVSh), and the number of non-zero quote midpoint changes (∆QMid). Liquidity proxies are: effective spread weighted by 
trade size (x100) (ESpr); time-weighted quoted depth (Depth); and LOB elasticity (LOBElast). ESpr is an inverse measure while Depth and LOBElast are direct measures of 
liquidity. Market activity proxies are: the daily volume in shares (Vol) (/104); the daily volume in euros (Vol€) (/106), and the daily number of trades (Trades). The explanatory 
variable of interest is the dummy for the post-events period (“Post-Events”). We use the one period lagged IBEX-35 volatility variable (Volat
-1) as a control. We report results 
for our full sample of 28 stocks (All Stocks) and for the Blue Chips separately. We also report the implied estimated percentage change in each proxy (% change). 
 
Panel A: HFT
Variable MTMin MTV€ MTVSh ∆QMid MTMin MTV€ MTVSh ∆QMid
Cons. 64.36 *** 0.2001 *** 0.0411 *** 4536.12 *** 116.23 *** 0.0605 *** 0.0139 ** 5818.00 ***
Post-Events 19.16 * 0.0941 0.0070 -622.46 76.16 *** 0.0811 *** 0.0175 1135.07
Volat
-1 8.93 *** 0.0054 0.0002 864.05 *** 21.48 *** 0.0018 -0.0004 1648.27 ***
Obs. 5852 5852 5852 5852 1463 1463 1463 1463
Adj.-R2 0.0149 0.0144 0.0029 0.0144 0.1046 0.3454 0.0562 0.0375
F 138.41 68.43 23.09 95.15 231.03 614.89 91.12 73.54
% change † 30% * 47% 17% -14% 65% *** 134% *** 126% 19%
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
All stocks Blue chips
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TABLE 2 (Cont.) 
All events combined: HFT, liquidity, and market activity 
 
Panel B: Liquidity
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast ESpr Depth LOBElast
Cons. 0.0870 *** 236000 *** 26800 *** 0.0503 *** 476000 ** 45900 ***
Post-Events 0.0234 *** -4250 -3790 *** 0.0099 *** -63300 -6570 ***
Volat
-1 0.0064 *** -17900 *** -1340 *** 0.0027 *** -33500 ** -2360 ***
Obs. 5852 5852 5852 1463 1463 1463
Adj.-R2 0.0443 0.002 0.0307 0.0708 0.0157 0.0684
F 316.66 14.53 579.02 103.45 33.30 238.72
% change † 27% *** -2% -14% *** 20% *** -13% -14% ***
Panel C: Market activity
Variable Vol Vol€ Trades Vol Vol€ Trades
Cons. 451.28 *** 48.80 *** 2555.38 *** 1390.53 *** 155.65 *** 6144.32 ***
Post-Events 112.76 -21.23 ** -361.91 *** -300.76 *** -75.55 *** -1190.00 ***
VLT(-1) 51.39 *** 3.54 *** 230.39 *** 152.46 *** 11.95 *** 652.77 ***
Obs. 5852 5852 5852 1463 1463 1463
Adj.-R2 0.0033 0.0158 0.0044 0.0114 0.0902 0.0223
F 29.39 206.25 77.08 35.41 200.31 59.24
% change † 25% -43% ** -14% *** -22% *** -48% *** -19% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
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TABLE 3 
All events combined: volatility, price efficiency, realized spreads, and price impacts 
We evaluate the net impact of the technological upgrades and short sale bans on the SSE from 2011 to 2012 on volatility and price efficiency (Panel A), and realized spreads 
and price impacts (Panel B). We compare the “pre-events” (February 1, 2011 – June 31, 2011) and “post-events” periods (February 1, 2013 - June 31, 2013). This table 
presents the estimated coefficients from pooled regressions with double-clustered standard errors. In Panel A, realized volatility (RVolat) is the daily standard deviation of 1-
minute trade price returns (x100). Efficiency proxies are the autocorrelation of 1-minute trade price returns (Corr) and the pricing error standard deviation (PrErr), estimated 
using Hasbrouck (1993). In Panel B, price impact (PrImp) measures the informativeness of trades (adverse selection cost), and the realized spread (RSpr) measures how much 
of the effective spread is earned by the liquidity provider. Price impact and realized spread are measured over 5-second and 30-second horizons after the trade. The 
explanatory variable of interest is the dummy for the post-events period (“Post-Events”). We use the one period lagged IBEX-35 volatility variable (Volat
-1) as a control. We 
report results for our full sample of 28 stocks (All Stocks) and for the Blue Chips separately. We also report the implied estimated percentage change in each proxy (% 
change). 
  
Panel A: Realized volatility and price efficiency
Variable RVolat Corr PrErr RVolat Corr PrErr
Cons. 0.0756 *** 0.0619 *** 0.0214 *** 0.0610 *** 0.0636 *** 0.0121 ***
Post-Events 0.0045 0.0082 *** 0.0001 0.0044 0.0055 -0.0012 **
Volat
-1 0.0097 *** 0.0020 0.0016 *** 0.0089 *** -0.0004 0.0007 ***
Obs. 5852 5852 5852 1463 1463 1463
Adj.-R2 0.0521 0.0074 0.0051 0.1323 0.0031 0.0193
F 291.93 22.60 34.06 138.90 2.25 20.79
% change † 6% 13% 0% 7% 9% -10% **
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
All stocks Blue chips
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TABLE 3 (Cont.) 
All events combined: volatility, price efficiency, realized spreads and price impacts 
  
Panel B: Realized spread and price impact
Variable RSpr5 RSpr30 PrImp5 PrImp30 RSpr5 RSpr30 PrImp5 PrImp30
Cons. 0.0350 *** 0.0264 *** 0.0398 *** 0.0485 *** 0.0194 *** 0.0138 *** 0.0243 *** 0.0299 ***
Post-Events -0.0037 -0.0062 0.0178 *** 0.0203 *** -0.0078 *** -0.0077 *** 0.0123 *** 0.0122 ***
Volat
-1 0.0003 -0.0014 * 0.0055 *** 0.0071 *** -0.0005 -0.0010 * 0.0035 *** 0.0040 ***
Obs. 5852 5852 5852 5852 1463 1463 1463 1463
Adj.-R2 0.004 0.014 0.1342 0.1189 0.1276 0.1297 0.2688 0.1928
F 25.1373 67.1262 939.5477 798.7403 170.67 134.46 466.40 323.45
% change † -11% -24% 45% *** 42% *** -40% *** -56% *** 50% *** 41% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
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TABLE 4 
SIBE-Smart: HFT, liquidity, and market activity 
We evaluate the impact of the introduction of the SIBE Smart on HFT activity (Panel A), liquidity (Panel B), and market activity (Panel C). We compare the “pre-Smart” 
(March 1, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and “post-Smart” periods (April 16, 2012 - May 31, 2012). This table presents the estimated coefficients from pooled regressions with 
double-clustered standard errors. HFT proxies are: message traffic per minute (MTMin); message traffic per euro-volume (MTV€); message traffic per volume in shares 
(MTVSh), and the number of non-zero quote midpoint changes (∆QMid). Liquidity proxies are: effective spread weighted by trade size (x100) (ESpr); time-weighted quoted 
depth (Depth); and LOB elasticity (LOBElast). ESpr is an inverse measure while Depth and LOBElast are direct measures of liquidity. Market activity proxies are: the daily 
volume in shares (Vol) (/104); the daily volume in euros (Vol€) (/106), and the daily number of trades (Trades). The explanatory variable of interest is the dummy for the post-
Smart period (“Post-Smart”). We use one period lagged IBEX-35 volatility variable (Volat
-1) as a control. We report results for our full sample of 28 stocks (All Stocks) and 
for the Blue Chips separately. We also report the implied estimated percentage change in each proxy (% change).  
  
Panel A: HFT
Variable MTMin MTV€ MTVSh ∆QMid MTMin MTV€ MTVSh ∆QMid
Cons. 104.52 *** 0.3331 *** 0.0528 *** 5651.39 *** 224.77 *** 0.1302 *** 0.0243 ** 8358.08 ***
Post-Smart 7.58 *** 0.098 * 0.0121 5478.93 *** 26.81 *** 0.0101 -0.0023 8948.44 ***
Volat
-1 10.03 *** 0.0039 *** -0.0011 1587.80 ** 20.21 *** 0.0005 *** -0.0002 2802.86 **
Obs. 1762 1762 1762 1762 441 441 441 441
Adj.-R2 0.0073 0.0167 0.0041 0.0842 0.0207 0.0053 0.002 0.1051
F 50.85 27.54 11.83 216.23 27.06 2.56 3.41 86.05
% change † 7% *** 29% * 23% 96% *** 12% *** 8% -9% 106% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
All stocks Blue chips
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TABLE 4 (Cont.) 
SIBE-Smart: HFT, liquidity, and market activity 
 
Panel B: Liquidity
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast ESpr Depth LOBElast
Cons. 0.0926 *** 212000 *** 23400 *** 0.0489 *** 462000 *** 43000 ***
Post-Smart 0.0422 *** -47200 *** -4040 *** 0.0153 *** -103000 ** -6760 ***
Volat
-1 0.0051 *** -8280 *** -1130 *** 0.0034 *** -27000 *** -2290 ***
Obs. 1762 1762 1762 441 441 441
Adj.-R2 0.0752 0.0337 0.062 0.1827 0.0963 0.1661
F 200.61 176.73 513.48 130.21 87.00 187.51
% change † 46% *** -22% *** -17% *** 31% *** -22% ** -16% ***
Panel C: Market activity
Variable Vol Vol€ Trades Vol Vol€ Trades
Cons. 496.06 *** 48.21 *** 2572.71 *** 1446.34 *** 123.15 *** 6547.95 ***
Post-Smart 80.99 *** -16.69 *** 303.46 *** 325.39 *** -0.52 792.66 ***
Volat
-1 45.50 *** 3.90 *** 219.66 *** 151.18 *** 6.28 *** 552.06 **
Obs. 1762 3892 3892 441 441 441
Adj.-R2 0.0031 0.0028 0.007 0.0168 0.0029 0.0201
F 21.18 34.84 85.67 20.01 2.37 18.98
% change † 16% *** -35% *** 12% *** 22% *** -0.42% 12% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
37 
 
TABLE 5 
SIBE-Smart: realized volatility, price efficiency, realized spread, and price impact 
We evaluate the impact of the introduction of the SIBE Smart on volatility and price efficiency (Panel A), and realized spreads and price impacts (Panel B). We compare the 
“pre-Smart” (March 1, 2012 – April 15, 2012) and “post-Smart” (April 16, 2012 - May 31, 2012) periods. This table presents the estimated coefficients from pooled 
regressions with double-clustered standard errors. In Panel A, realized volatility (RVolat) is the daily standard deviation of 1-minute trade price returns (x100). Efficiency 
proxies are the autocorrelation of 1-minute trade price returns (Corr) and the pricing error standard deviation (PrErr), estimated using Hasbrouck (1993). In Panel B, price 
impact (PrImp) measures the informativeness of trades (adverse selection cost), and the realized spread (RSpr) measures how much of the effective spread is earned by the 
liquidity provider. Price impact and realized spread are measured over 5-second and 30-second horizons after the trade. The explanatory variable of interest is the dummy for 
the post-Smart period (“Post-Smart”). We use one period lagged IBEX-35 volatility variable (Volat
-1) as a control. We report results for our full sample of 28 stocks (All 
Stocks) and for the Blue Chips separately. We also report the implied estimated percentage change in each proxy (% change). 
  
Panel A: Realized volatility and price efficiency
Variable RVolat Corr PrErr RVolat Corr PrErr
Cons. 0.0769 *** 0.0640 *** 0.0212 *** 0.0613 *** 0.0549 *** 0.0104 ***
Post-Smart 0.0404 *** 0.0100 ** 0.0100 *** 0.0288 *** 0.0161 ** 0.0025 ***
Volat
-1 0.0089 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0010 ** 0.0090 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0007 ***
Obs. 3892 1762 1762 441 441 441
Adj.-R2 0.2877 0.0082 0.0725 0.4387 0.0284 0.1202
F 1400.03 7.84 194.1182 314.29 7.88 52.7391
% change † 52% *** 16% ** 47% *** 47% *** 29% ** 24% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
All stocks Blue chips
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TABLE 5 (Cont.) 
SIBE-Smart: realized volatility, price efficiency, realized spread, and price impact 
 
 
Panel B: Realized spread and price impact
Variable RSpr5 RSpr30 PrImp5 PrImp30 RSpr5 RSpr30 PrImp5 PrImp30
Cons. 0.0244 *** 0.0147 *** 0.0580 *** 0.0676 *** 0.0134 *** 0.0102 *** 0.0287 *** 0.0317 ***
Post-Smart 0.0081 * 0.0069 0.0221 *** 0.0234 *** -0.0039 -0.0034 0.0151 *** 0.0146 ***
Volat
-1 -0.0023 *** -0.0034 *** 0.0060 *** 0.0071 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0020 *** 0.0046 *** 0.0049 ***
Obs. 1762 1762 1762 1762 441 441 441 441
Adj.-R2 0.0076 0.0066 0.1505 0.1227 0.0814 0.0913 0.2981 0.2583
F 15.15 10.26 451.49 394.01 27.60 25.97 210.87 202.4633
% change † 33% * 47% 38% *** 35% *** -29% -33% 52% *** 0.4590642 ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
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TABLE 6 
Short-selling bans: comparative effect on HFT activity, liquidity, and market activity 
We evaluate the relative impact of the second short-selling ban (SSB2), which affects all stocks, from July 23, 2012 to November 11, 2012 (before colocation is introduced) to 
the effect of the first short-selling ban (SSB1), which affects only financial stocks (eight in our sample) from August 11, 2011 to February 15, 2012. We test for differences in 
the level of HFT activity (Panel A), liquidity (Panel B), and market activity (Panel C) in SSB2 versus SSB1. This table presents the estimated coefficients from pooled 
regressions with double-clustered standard errors. HFT proxies are: message traffic per minute (MTMin); message traffic per euro-volume (MTV€); message traffic per 
volume in shares (MTVSh), and the number of non-zero quote midpoint changes (∆QMid). Liquidity proxies are: effective spread weighted by trade size (x100) (ESpr); time-
weighted quoted depth (Depth); and LOB elasticity (LOBElast). ESpr is an inverse measure while Depth and LOBElast are direct measures of liquidity. Market activity 
proxies are: the daily volume in shares (Vol) (/104); the daily volume in euros (Vol€) (/106), and the daily number of trades (Trades). The explanatory variable of interest is the 
dummy for the second short-sale ban period (SSB2). We report results for our full sample of 28 stocks (All Stocks) and for the Blue Chips separately. We also report the 
implied estimated percentage change in each proxy (% change). 
 
  
Panel A: HFT
Variable MTMin MTV€ MTVSh ∆QMid MTMin MTV€ MTVSh ∆QMid
Cons. 97.97 *** 0.3426 *** 0.0552 *** 6027.38 *** 228.93 *** 0.1442 *** 0.0274 ** 11600.00 ***
SSB2 -75.89 *** -0.036 -0.0106 ** -2920.00 *** -185.13 *** -0.0464 *** -0.0057 *** -5490.00 **
Volat
-1 14.04 *** 0.007 0 1262.23 *** 37.39 *** 0.0041 ** -0.0004 2834.54 ***
Obs. 5992 5992 5992 5992 1498 1498 1498 1498
Adj.-R2 0.0891 0.0031 0.0047 0.05 0.2587 0.0783 0.0081 0.0919
F 903.74 12.62 31.49 414.51 529.69 100.99 29.24 170.53
% change † -77% *** -11% -19% ** -48% *** -81% *** -32% *** -21% *** -47% **
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
All stocks Blue chips
40 
 
TABLE 6 (Cont.) 
Short-selling bans: comparative effect on HFT activity, liquidity, and market activity   
 
Panel B: Liquidity
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast ESpr Depth LOBElast
Cons. 0.1109 *** 187000 *** 20000 *** 0.0570 *** 383000 *** 36000 ***
SSB2 0.0571 *** -40100 ** -3800 *** 0.0252 *** -101000 * -7910 ***
Volat
-1 0.0117 *** -4460 -1020 *** 0.0057 *** -13700 -1760 ***
Obs. 5992 5992 5992 1498 1498 1498
Adj.-R2 0.0969 0.0162 0.0538 0.1864 0.048 0.1653
F 676.91 123.49 848.03 278.82 61.70 398.39
% change † 51% *** -21% ** -19% *** 44% *** -26% * -22% ***
Panel C: Market activity
Variable Vol Vol€ Trades Vol Vol€ Trades
Cons. 348.28 *** 33.87 *** 2149.84 *** 1128.20 *** 108.86 *** 5317.02 ***
SSB2 -58.07 -14.97 *** -726.31 *** -279.58 *** -47.79 *** -1790.00 ***
Volat
-1 52.06 *** 2.99 *** 200.83 *** 175.18 *** 10.41 *** 631.30 ***
Obs. 5992 5992 5992 1498 1498 1498
Adj.-R2 0.0063 0.0158 0.0213 0.0331 0.0839 0.0892
F 93.26 208.82 299.21 86.63 161.42 176.03
% change † -17% -44% *** -0.34 *** -25% *** -44% *** -0.34 ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
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TABLE 7 
Short-selling bans: Comparative effect on realized volatility, price efficiency, realized spreads, and price impacts 
We evaluate the relative impact of the second short-selling ban (SSB2), which affects all stocks, from July 23, 2012 to November 11, 2012 (before colocation is introduced) to 
the effect of the first short-selling ban (SSB1), which affects only financial stocks (eight in our sample) from August 11, 2011 to February 15, 2012. We test for differences in 
volatility and price efficiency (Panel A), and realized spreads and price impacts (Panel B) between SSB2 and SSB1. This table presents the estimated coefficients from pooled 
regressions with double-clustered standard errors. In Panel A, realized volatility (RVolat) is the daily standard deviation of 1-minute trade price returns (x100). Efficiency 
proxies are the autocorrelation of 1-minute trade price returns (Corr) and the pricing error standard deviation (PrErr), estimated using Hasbrouck (1993). In Panel B, price 
impact (PrImp) measures the informativeness of trades (adverse selection cost), and the realized spread (RSpr) measures how much of the effective spread is earned by the 
liquidity provider. Price impact and realized spread are measured over 5-second and 30-second horizons after the trade. The explanatory variable of interest is the dummy for 
the second short-sale ban period (SSB2). We report results for our full sample of 28 stocks (All Stocks) and for the Blue Chips separately. We also report the implied 
estimated percentage change in each proxy (% change). 
  
Panel A: Realized volatility and price efficiency
Variable RVolat Corr PrErr RVolat Corr PrErr
Cons. 0.0815 *** 0.0638 *** 0.0254 *** 0.0647 *** 0.0562 *** 0.0116 ***
SSB2 0.0058 0.0085 *** 0.0111 *** 0.0081 0.0039 0.0060 ***
Volat
-1 0.0171 *** 0.0010 0.0036 *** 0.0153 *** 0.0035 ** 0.0018 ***
Obs. 5992 5992 5988 1498 1498 1498
Adj.-R2 0.2129 0.0059 0.0671 0.3596 0.0101 0.212
F 1240.85 18.00 420.58 467.82 7.73 268.51
% change † 7% 13% *** 44% *** 12% 7% 52% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
All stocks Blue chips
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TABLE 7 (Cont.) 
Short-selling bans: Comparative effect on realized volatility, price efficiency, realized spreads, and price impacts 
 
Panel B: Realized spread and price impact
Variable RSpr5 RSpr30 PrImp5 PrImp30 RSpr5 RSpr30 PrImp5 PrImp30
Cons. 0.0425 *** 0.0331 *** 0.0549 *** 0.0641 *** 0.0173 *** 0.0124 *** 0.0325 *** 0.0374 ***
SSB2 0.0205 *** 0.0188 *** 0.0140 *** 0.0156 *** 0.0086 ** 0.0043 0.0108 *** 0.015 ***
Volat
-1 0.0015 -0.0003 0.0089 *** 0.0107 *** -0.0005 -0.001 0.0053 *** 0.0058 ***
Obs. 5992 5992 5992 5992 1498 1498 1498 1498
Adj.-R2 0.0383 0.0308 0.1098 0.1077 0.0769 0.0266 0.1835 0.1937
F 256.45 173.38 751.85 724.63 79.55 23.65 286.03 299.62
% change † 48% *** 57% *** 26% *** 24% *** 50% ** 35% 33% *** 40% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
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TABLE 8 
Colocation: HFT, liquidity, and market activity 
Colocation services are introduced on the SSE on November 12, 2012, with an overlapping short-selling ban period that starts on July 23, 2012 and ends on January 31, 2013. 
We test for differences in the level of HFT (Panel A), liquidity (Panel B), and market activity (Panel C) before and after colocation. First, we compare the “pre-colocation” 
period (July 23, 2013 – November 11, 2012), a time with banned short-selling and no colocation, with the “post-colocation” period (November 12, 2012 – January 31, 2013), 
a time with banned short-selling and colocation. Second, we compare the “pre-ban” period (April 16, 2012 – July 22, 2012), a time with no ban and no colocation, with the 
“post-ban” period (February 1, 2013 – June 31, 2013), a time with no ban but with colocation. This table presents the estimated coefficients from pooled regressions with 
double-clustered standard errors. HFT proxies are: message traffic per minute (MTMin); message traffic per euro-volume (MTV€); message traffic per volume in shares 
(MTVSh), and the number of non-zero quote midpoint changes (∆QMid). Liquidity proxies are: effective spread weighted by trade size (x100) (ESpr); time-weighted quoted 
depth (Depth); and LOB elasticity (LOBElast). ESpr is an inverse measure while Depth and LOBElast are direct measures of liquidity. Market activity proxies are: the daily 
volume in shares (Vol) (/104); the daily volume in euros (Vol€) (/106), and the daily number of trades (Trades). The explanatory variables of interest are the dummy variables 
for Post- vs pre-colocation and Post- vs pre-ban. We report results for our full sample of 28 stocks (All Stocks) and for the Blue Chips separately. We also report the implied 
estimated percentage change in each proxy (% change). 
 
Panel A: HFT
Variable MTMin MTV€ MTVSh ∆QMid Obs. MTMin MTV€ MTVSh ∆QMid Obs.
Cons. 39.17 *** 0.2971 *** 0.0445 *** 3322.88 *** 3808 94.16 *** 0.099 *** 0.0206 * 7366.46 ** 952
Post- vs. pre-colocation -3.00 -0.1245 *** -0.0158 *** -2200.00 *** -5.01 -0.0106 -0.0031 -4630.00 ***
Volat
-1 7.03 *** 0.0109 0.0000 1173.18 *** 16.75 *** 0.0036 0.0000 *** 2334.67 ***
Adj.-R2 0.0206 0.0312 0.0159 0.1055 0.0511 0.0141 0.003 0.1794
% change † -8% -42% *** -36% *** -66% *** -5% -11% -15% -62% ***
Cons. 106.73 *** 0.429 *** 0.06 *** 12300.00 *** 4816 222.88 *** 0.1359 *** 0.0235 * 18000.00 *** 1204
Post- vs. pre-ban -22.34 ** -0.148 ** -0.0155 -8920.00 *** -26.27 0.007 0.0084 * -11600.00 ***
Volat
-1 8.46 *** 0.0125 ** 0.0021 *** 1129.20 *** 19.22 *** 0.0011 -0.0007 *** 1966.87 **
Adj.-R2 0.0168 0.0225 0.0088 0.1953 0.0262 0.0016 0.0119 0.199
% change † -21% ** -34% ** -26% -72% *** -12% 5% 36% * -64% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
All stocks Blue chips
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TABLE 8 (Cont.) 
Colocation: HFT, liquidity, and market activity 
 
Panel B: Liquidity
Variable ESpr Depth LOBElast Obs. ESpr Depth LOBElast Obs.
Cons. 0.1056 *** 252000 *** 23000 *** 3808 0.0590 *** 452000 *** 39700 *** 952
Post- vs. pre-colocation 0.0424 *** 7189 ** -2820 *** 0.0148 ** 85400 * -3660 ***
Volat
-1 0.0090 *** -28700 -1350 *** 0.0034 *** -54700 -2540 **
Adj.-R2 0.0437 0.0031 0.012 0.0399 0.0099 0.0175
% change † 40% *** 3% ** -12% *** 25% ** 19% * -9% ***
Cons. 0.1345 *** 150000 *** 17600 *** 4816 0.0704 *** 276000 *** 32000 *** 1204
Post- vs. pre-ban -0.0224 *** 64800 ** 4117 *** -0.0073 * 99900 ** 4822 ***
Volat
-1 0.0054 *** -9010 *** -635 *** 0.0012 -14100 ** -1000 ***
Adj.-R2 0.0272 0.0358 0.0465 0.0308 0.0865 0.0551
% change † -17% *** 43% ** 23% *** -10% * 36% ** 15% ***
Panel C: Market activity
Variable Variable Vol Vol€ Trades Obs. Vol Vol€ Trades Obs.
Cons. 295.68 *** 20.92 *** 1397.90 *** 3808 832.26 ** 67.23 *** 3529.15 *** 952
Post- vs. pre-colocation 200.08 1.03 76.79 -122.19 ** -4.92 -284.55
Volat
-1 49.82 *** 2.16 *** 211.34 *** 181.89 *** 7.88 *** 630.90 ***
Adj.-R2 0.0056 0.0031 0.0118 0.043 0.0277 0.0701
% change † 67% 5% 5% -15% ** -7% -8%
Cons. 591.36 *** 35.96 *** 2870.87 *** 4816 1862.84 *** 116.50 *** 7276.41 *** 1204
Post- vs. pre-ban 16.55 -4.40 *** -538.59 *** -635.33 ** -22.79 *** -1870.00 ***
Volat
-1 27.88 *** 1.40 *** 156.01 *** 78.66 *** 4.66 *** 411.29 ***
Adj.-R2 0.0044 0.0030 0.0067 0.0388 0.0246 0.0565
% change † 3% -12% *** -19% *** -34% ** -20% *** -26% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
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TABLE 9 
Colocation: realized volatility, price efficiency, realized spreads, and price impacts 
Colocation services are introduced on the SSE on November 12, 2012, with an overlapping short-selling ban period that starts on July 23, 2012 and ends on January 31, 2013. 
We test for differences in realized volatility and price efficiency (Panel A), and realized spreads and price impacts (Panel B) before and after colocation. First, we compare the 
“pre-colocation” period (July 23, 2013 – November 11, 2012), a time with banned short-selling and no colocation, with the “post-colocation” period (November 12, 2012 – 
January 31, 2013), a time with banned short-selling and colocation. Second, we compare the “pre-ban” period (April 16, 2012 – July 22, 2012), a time with no ban and no 
colocation, with the “post-ban” period (February 1, 2013 – June 31, 2013), a time with no ban but with colocation. This table presents the estimated coefficients from pooled 
regressions with double-clustered standard errors. In Panel A, realized volatility (RVolat) is the daily standard deviation of 1-minute trade price returns (x100). Efficiency 
proxies are the autocorrelation of 1-minute trade price returns (Corr) and the pricing error standard deviation (PrErr), estimated using Hasbrouck (1993). In Panel B, price 
impact (PrImp) measures the informativeness of trades (adverse selection cost), and the realized spread (RSpr) measures how much of the effective spread is earned by the 
liquidity provider. Price impact and realized spread are measured over 5-second and 30-second horizons after the trade. The explanatory variables of interest are the dummy 
variables for Post- vs pre-colocation and Post- vs pre-ban. We report results for our full sample of 28 stocks (All Stocks) and for the Blue Chips separately. We also report the 
implied estimated percentage change in each proxy (% change). 
 
Panel A: Realized volatility and price efficiency
Variable RVolat Corr PrErr RVolat Corr PrErr Obs.
Cons. 0.0890 *** 0.0700 *** 0.0362 *** 0.0757 *** 0.0555 *** 0.0173 *** 952
Post- vs. pre-colocation -0.0133 *** 0.0131 *** -0.0053 *** -0.0228 *** 0.0096 ** -0.0021
Volat
-1 0.0164 *** 0.0020 0.0038 *** 0.0141 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0020 ***
Adj.-R2 0.2179 0.0084 0.0533 0.5306 0.0151 0.1025
% change † -15% *** 19% *** -15% *** -30% *** 17% ** -12%
Cons. 0.1182 *** 0.0680 *** 0.0328 *** 0.0968 *** 0.0659 *** 0.0164 *** 1204
Post- vs. pre-ban -0.0338 *** 0.0021 -0.0100 *** -0.026 *** -0.0016 -0.0039 ***
Volat
-1 0.0073 *** 0.0020 * 0.0009 *** 0.006 *** 0.0022 -0.0001
Adj.-R2 0.2467 0.0009 0.0659 0.4112 0.0026 0.0921
% change † -29% *** 3% -30% *** -27% *** -2% -24% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
All stocks Blue chips
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TABLE 9 (Cont.) 
Colocation: realized volatility, price efficiency, realized spread, and price impact 
 
Panel B: Realized spread and price impact
Variable RSpr5 RSpr30 PrImp5 PrImp30 RSpr5 RSpr30 PrImp5 PrImp30 Obs.
Cons. 0.0617 *** 0.0512 *** 0.0723 *** 0.0827 *** 0.0271 *** 0.0191 *** 0.0450 *** 0.0528 *** 952
Post- vs. pre-colocation -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0191 *** -0.0193 *** 0.0047 0.0062 ** -0.0160 *** -0.0174 ***
Volat
-1 0.002 0.0000 0.0075 *** 0.0095 *** -0.0009 -0.0020 ** 0.0046 *** 0.0056 ***
Adj.-R2 0.0042 0.0003 0.1285 0.1207 0.0274 0.0622 0.2841 0.2636
% change † -3% -3% -26% *** -23% *** 17% 33% ** -35% *** -33% ***
Cons. 0.0308 *** 0.0208 *** 0.0796 *** 0.0895 *** 0.0097 *** 0.0059 *** 0.0467 *** 0.0504 *** 1204
Post- vs. pre-ban 0.0019 0.0001 -0.0212 *** -0.0194 *** 0.0034 ** 0.0009 -0.0093 *** -0.0068 ***
Volat
-1 -0.0005 -0.0017 ** 0.0051 *** 0.0063 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** 0.0031 *** 0.0032 ***
Adj.-R2 0.0011 0.0023 0.1355 0.0951 0.0602 0.0249 0.1594 0.088
% change † 6% 0% -27% *** -22% *** 35% ** 15% -20% *** -13% ***
***, **, * indicates statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
† Control variable evaluated at  the mean
